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Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? 















We evaluate why individuals invest in high-fee index funds. In our experiments, subjects each 
allocate $10,000 across four S&P 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio’s 
subsequent return. Subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees. We reject the hypothesis that 
subjects buy high-fee index funds because of bundled non-portfolio services. Search costs for 
fees matter, but even when we eliminate these costs, fees are not minimized. Instead, subjects 
place high weight on annualized returns since inception. Fees paid decrease with financial 
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Mutual fund fees vary by an order of magnitude across firms, even though the industry 
has hundreds of competing providers. There is scant evidence that more expensive funds pick 
securities well enough to offset their higher fees (e.g., Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997). Hence, it is 
puzzling that competition has not eliminated high-fee funds. The puzzle is especially acute in the 
index fund market, where funds tracking a given index offer virtually identical portfolio returns 
before fees, but price dispersion is no smaller than in the actively managed fund market 
(Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004). In 2007, retail S&P 500 index fund investors paid $206 million 
more in expenses (excluding sales loads) than they would have if their entire S&P 500 index 
fund balance were in the retail no-load S&P 500 index fund with the lowest expense ratio. These 
excess payments are 58% of total non-load expenses paid to retail S&P 500 index funds in 2007, 
and 0.12% of total assets under management in retail S&P 500 index funds in 2007.
1 
Some researchers have argued that high index fund fees reduce investor welfare, since 
they are sustained by investors’ search costs (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Hortaçsu and Syverson, 
2004) or mistakes abetted by mutual fund marketing (Elton, Gruber, and Busse, 2004; Barber, 
Odean, and Zheng, 2005; Cronqvist, 2006). The mutual fund industry has countered that “S&P 
500 index funds themselves are not commodities. These funds differ from one another through 
the services that are packaged with their securities portfolios and through other characteristics,” 
(Collins, 2005, p. 2). These non-portfolio services include financial advice, customer service, and 
discounted access to complementary investment instruments. Thus, investors in expensive funds 
may receive higher quality non-portfolio services that fairly compensate them for their lower 
financial returns. 
                                                 
1 We use the CRSP mutual fund database to compute these figures. Monthly expenses are calculated using the 
following formula: Prior month-end total net assets × (1 – (1 – expense ratio)
1/12). We then add up monthly expenses 
to obtain expenses for 2007. Total amount invested in S&P 500 index funds is the average at each month-end from 
December 31, 2006 to November 30, 2007 of the sum of all relevant funds’ total net assets.   3
Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004) find no evidence for the non-portfolio service hypothesis 
when they regress index fund net inflows on proxies for service quality. There is no significant 
correlation of flows with service quality rankings from a Dalbar survey, as well as with several 
other measures of non-portfolio service quality. Inflows are positively related to the number of 
Morningstar categories covered by the fund’s family, perhaps suggesting a demand for 
complementary investment instruments, but simply investing in low-expense or high-past-alpha 
funds delivers superior future portfolio returns and a higher number of Morningstar categories in 
the selected families. However, non-portfolio services and their quality are difficult to measure. 
It is therefore possible that high-fee index fund investors are receiving services not captured by 
Elton, Gruber, and Busse’s proxies. Furthermore, even if it were established that investors were 
receiving some extra services in exchange for lower portfolio returns, it would remain unclear 
whether a rational investor would pay such a high price for these services. 
This paper reports new experimental evidence that sheds light on whether rational 
demand for non-portfolio services can account for the existence of high-fee index funds. We 
asked 730 experimental subjects to each allocate a hypothetical $10,000 among four real S&P 
500 index funds. All subjects received the funds’ prospectuses. To make choices incentive-
compatible, subjects’ expected payments depended on the actual returns of their portfolios over a 
specified time period after the experimental session. We offered especially large incentives in 
one version of our experiment; for each of the 391 subjects in this implementation, choosing the 
most expensive portfolio instead of the least expensive portfolio reduced his or her wealth by 
$94. 
Our experimental setting gives us direct control of non-portfolio services. Because the 
investments were intermediated by the experimenters (and not by the fund companies   4
themselves), no non-portfolio services were provided. Thus, the optimal portfolio allocates 
everything to the lowest-cost index fund.  
The composition of our subject pool made it more likely that we would find support for 
rational theories. Our largest subject group (which received the largest incentives) consists of 
Harvard staff members—all white collar non-faculty employees—who on average have many 
years of experience managing their personal finances. Furthermore, 88% have a college degree, 
and 60% have graduate school education as well. Our next largest group of participants consists 
of MBA students from Wharton. The remaining subjects are college students recruited on the 
Harvard campus. Our MBA subjects report an average combined SAT score of 1453, which is at 
the 98th percentile nationally, and our college subjects report an average score of 1499, which is 
at the 99th percentile. When we measure financial literacy directly, we find that all three subject 
groups are more knowledgeable than the typical American investor. 
Despite eliminating non-portfolio services, we find that almost none of the subjects 
minimized fees. On average, staff, MBA students, and college students respectively paid 201, 
112, and 122 basis points more in fees than they needed to when they received only the funds’ 
prospectuses to aid their decision. Staff and college students reported in debriefing surveys that 
fees played relatively little role in their portfolio decision. MBAs claimed that fees were the most 
important decision factor for them, yet their portfolio fees are not statistically lower than college 
students’ fees. All subject groups reported placing high weight on past returns. This would be 
sensible if the past returns in the prospectuses were measured over the same horizon. But the 
mutual funds we offered had differing fund inception dates and prospectus publishing cycles. In 
fact, we constructed our fund menus so that the longest-horizon annualized historical returns   5
reported in the prospectuses are positively correlated with fees. As a result, chasing the past 
returns reported in the prospectuses lowered future expected returns. 
Given that subjects are making mistakes in their portfolio choices, are there information 
interventions that can alter the magnitude and frequency of these mistakes? We test three such 
treatments by comparing subjects who were randomly assigned to receive only the fund 
prospectuses to subjects who were randomly assigned to receive the prospectuses plus additional 
information.  
In one treatment condition, we gave subjects a one-page “cheat sheet” that summarized 
the funds’ front-end loads and expense ratios. If the cost of finding the fees in the prospectus is 
the principal reason why our subjects invested in high-fee index funds, then receiving the fees 
sheet prior to making the portfolio decision should cause them to pay nearly the minimum 
possible fees.  
In a second treatment condition, we distributed one page of answers to frequently asked 
questions (FAQs) about S&P 500 index funds. The sheet told subjects that all S&P 500 index 
funds seek to make their pre-fee investment returns approximate the S&P 500’s return. If a 
failure to understand the commodity nature of S&P 500 index funds lies behind our subjects’ 
decisions, then this FAQ intervention may mitigate portfolio choice errors. 
Our third treatment made salient a particular historical return, as some mutual fund 
advertising strives to do (Jain and Wu, 2000; Sapp and Tiwari, 2004; Cronqvist, 2006; 
Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer, 2008). Subjects in this condition received a summary 
sheet that showed the longest-horizon historical annualized return reported in each fund’s 
prospectus—usually the fund’s return since inception. As noted previously, we constructed our 
fund menus so that these long-horizon historical returns are positively correlated with fees.    6
We find that eliminating search costs for fees improved portfolio allocations, but the 
effect is modest. Among those receiving the one-page fees summary sheet, 90% of staff and 
college students and 81% of MBAs still failed to minimize index fund fees. It thus appears that 
search costs play some role in but do not fully account for the willingness to hold high-fee index 
funds. When we explained what S&P 500 index funds are in the FAQ treatment, portfolio fees 
dropped modestly, but the statistical significance of this drop is marginal. Finally, highlighting 
misleading long-horizon historical returns by providing the returns summary sheet caused 
students to allocate more money to the fund with the highest long-horizon historical return. Staff 
portfolios, however, did not respond to the returns summary treatment.  It appears that the staff 
members who did not get the summary sheet were motivated enough to find this information 
without our help, precluding an effect from receiving the special sheet with highlighted returns. 
We conclude that mistakes driven by financial illiteracy are the primary source of the 
demand for high-fee index funds. Interestingly, investors in high-cost index funds have some 
sense that they are making a mistake. Those paying higher fees also reported having less 
confidence that their choice was optimal for them, a higher anticipated likelihood of changing 
their portfolio in response to professional investment advice, and less general investment 
knowledge. Our results add to a growing body of evidence that individual investors make 
suboptimal asset allocation decisions (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Cronqvist and Thaler, 
2004; Barber, Odean, and Zheng, 2005; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2005; Cronqvist, 2006; 
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, forthcoming). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes our experimental design. Section 2 
discusses the characteristics of our subject pool. Section 3 describes the main results from the 
experiment, and Section 4 interprets the results. Section 5 explores the link between portfolio   7
choices and subject characteristics. We conclude in Section 6. The experimental materials we 
distributed to subjects are in the appendices. 
 
1. S&P 500 Index Fund Experiment Design 
  We ran two versions of our investment experiment.  During the summer of 2005, we 
recruited MBA students at Wharton and college students at Harvard to participate.
2 Harvard staff 
members were recruited for the experiment in the summer of 2007. In both versions, subjects 
allocated a hypothetical $10,000 across four real S&P 500 index funds. They received a modest 
fee up-front for participating and were eligible for an additional delayed payment that depended 
on how their chosen portfolio actually performed after the experimental session. By basing 
payments on the future returns of real funds (instead of artificial funds constructed for the 
experiment), we made it clear to subjects that we had no private information about how their 
portfolio choices would affect their payments. 
  Student subjects were told that one participant would be selected at random to win any 
positive return his or her chosen allocation earned from September 1, 2005 through August 30, 
2006. Implementing the portfolio-based payment as a call option with a strike price of $10,000 
rather than a fixed percentage of the final portfolio value increased the marginal impact of 
subjects’ choices on their expected payment while keeping the experimental budget reasonable. 
In response to concerns that our student results are driven by the subjects’ low expected 
portfolio-based payment, we promised every subject in the 2007 Harvard staff experiment the 
upside return of their $10,000 portfolio, but only for the month of September 2007 rather than for 
a full year. We were writing a call option on $4 million of underlying securities, so we hedged   8
our short position by buying calls on our own outside account. Because of the high cost of this 
hedge, we used an investment horizon of only one month for the staff experiment. 
 A l l   s u b j e c t s   r e c e i v e d   p h o t o c o p i e s   o f  four S&P 500 index funds’ prospectuses. 
Prospectuses are often the only document sent to potential investors requesting information about 
a fund. Subjects also received a “choice sheet” on which they recorded their chosen investment 
allocation. Participants had to satisfy the real-life minimum opening balance requirement for any 
fund to which they made an allocation. These minimums were shown on the choice sheet. 
  We randomly divided our participants into four information conditions. Subjects in the 
prospectus-only condition received only the choice sheet and prospectuses for each of the funds. 
Subjects in the fees treatment condition also received a one-page “fees sheet.” The fees sheet 
explained that mutual funds charge fees, showed how to calculate the impact of loads and 
expense ratios on portfolio value, and listed the load, expense ratio, and dollar cost of the load 
and expense ratio for a one-year $10,000 investment in each of the four funds participants could 
select. All of the fees sheet information was also contained in the prospectuses. 
Subjects in the returns treatment condition received the choice sheet, prospectuses, and a 
one-page “returns sheet” listing the longest-horizon annualized historical returns net of all fees 
(including the load) reported in each of the four funds’ prospectuses. For student subjects, these 
long-horizon returns were all returns since the fund’s inception. For staff subjects, three of the 
long-horizon returns were returns since inception, and one was a ten-year return. (The reason for 
this discrepancy is explained later in this section.) The sheet showed the dates over which the 
returns were calculated, as well as the disclaimer, “Past performance is no guarantee of future 
results.” The date ranges of the long-horizon returns varied across funds. Thus, long-horizon 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The MBA students were mostly first-year students recruited during their pre-term orientation. Therefore, they had 
completed very little (if any) MBA coursework at the time of the experiment. Nonetheless, we believe this group to   9
return variation was driven almost entirely by the S&P 500’s performance during the date range 
and should be ignored when predicting future relative returns. There is extensive evidence that 
mutual fund investors chase past returns (Ippolito, 1992; Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 
1993; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), but the rationality of such behavior 
is a subject of debate (Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Zheng, 1999; Sapp and Tiwari, 2004; Berk 
and Green, 2004). Our experiment tests returns-chasing rationality by varying exposure to past 
return information that should have no effect on fund allocation decisions. 
In addition to the fees and returns treatment conditions described above, the Harvard staff 
experiment also included a frequently asked questions (FAQ) treatment condition. In this 
condition, subjects received the choice sheet, prospectuses, and one page of answers to the 
following questions: (1) What is a mutual fund? (2) What is an S&P 500 index fund? (3) What is 
the S&P 500 Index? If prospectus-only subjects choose high-cost funds simply because they do 
not understand that all S&P 500 index funds seek to imitate the same portfolio’s return, 
supplying these answers may shift subjects’ portfolios to lower-cost funds. 
In total, there were ten experimental groups: four staff groups (prospectus-only, fees 
treatment, returns treatment, FAQ treatment); three MBA groups (prospectus-only, fees 
treatment, returns treatment); and three college student groups (prospectus-only, fees treatment, 
returns treatment).  
Subjects in all groups were given as much time as they wanted to make their investment 
allocations. They were not allowed to confer with each other. After participants submitted their 
investment allocation, they completed a debriefing survey that measured demographics, financial 
literacy, self-reported time spent reading the prospectus, and motivations behind their portfolio 
choice. Students were also asked for their SAT scores. 
                                                                                                                                                             
be very sophisticated relative to the typical individual investor.   10
We used the following criteria to choose the four S&P 500 index funds offered to student 
subjects: (1) they were front-end load funds with wide variation in the total fees charged; (2) they 
were less than ten years old, and hence reported annualized returns since fund inception in their 
prospectus; (3) annualized returns since inception were positively correlated with fees across 
funds; and (4) their prospectus was available as a PDF document online. Slightly different 
criteria were used for staff subjects, as explained later. 
We wanted wide variation in the fees charged by the funds we offered so that subjects’ 
decisions would meaningfully affect their expected returns. The largest source of S&P 500 index 
fund fee variation is their loads, which vary in the CRSP mutual fund database from 0% to 
5.75% of invested funds. There is also substantial variation in annual expense ratios, which vary 
from 6 to 200 basis points. We restricted the set of funds under consideration to those with loads 
because we did not want to confound sensitivity to total fees with sensitivity to the mere 
presence of a load. We opted to include only front-end load funds (rather than also offering back-
end load funds) in order to facilitate explaining the funds’ fees on only one page. Barber, Odean, 
and Zheng (2005) present evidence that mutual fund investors are more sensitive to loads than 
expense ratios. Therefore, subjects are likely to be more sensitive to our experiment’s fund fees 
than to fees in the general index fund universe, where there are many no-load funds. 
  By requiring that funds offered to student subjects be less than ten years old, we ensured 
that their prospectuses reported annualized returns since inception. Because we wanted to 
distinguish irrational returns-chasing behavior from rational fee-avoiding behavior, we searched 
for a fund menu where fees were positively correlated with annualized returns since inception. 
After imposing the above criteria, the set of suitable S&P 500 index funds was 
remarkably small. The four funds we offered students are the Allegiant S&P 500 Index Fund, the   11
Mason Street Index 500 Stock Fund, the Morgan Stanley S&P 500 Index Fund, and the UBS 
S&P 500 Index Fund. For all four funds, we specified that subjects could only invest in the Class 
A shares. The funds offered to students, their ticker symbols, inception dates, minimum opening 
balance requirements, fees, historical returns, and results from a performance evaluation 
regression are listed in columns two through five of Table 1. With the exception of the 
annualized return standard deviation and regression results, these numbers are taken from the 
most recent prospectuses available at the time of the student experimental sessions, which listed 
returns through December 31, 2003. The return standard deviations are calculated using returns 
excluding loads and taxes, starting in the first full calendar month in which all the students’ 
funds were operating and ending in the last full calendar month before the student experimental 
sessions took place. The performance evaluation regressions run fund returns excluding loads 
and taxes on S&P 500 returns over this same time period. 
The expense ratio across the four student funds varies from 0.59% to 0.80%, and the load 
varies from 2.50% to 5.25%.
3 The total annual fee (expense ratio plus front-end load) on a 
$10,000 investment held for one year varies from a low of $309 for the Allegiant fund to a high 
of $589 for the Morgan Stanley fund.
4 Though the Allegiant fund is the lowest-cost fund, the 
total fee for the UBS fund is only $11 more. The other two, the Mason Street and Morgan 
Stanley funds, have substantially higher loads and expense ratios. 
                                                 
3 The expense ratio associated with each of these funds is not unambiguous because all four funds have in the past 
waived part of their stated expenses on an ad hoc basis each year. In this paper, we use the expense ratio from the 
prior year after any expense waivers, as stated in the prospectus, unless the fund guarantees the waiver level in the 
following year. Morningstar uses net-of-waiver expense ratios to rate funds. See Christoffersen (2001) for a 
discussion of mutual fund fee waivers. 
4 We calculate fees on a one-year $10,000 investment with the formula $10,000 × (expense ratio + load) for 
simplicity, since that was the total fee implicitly presented to subjects in the fees treatment condition. Calculating 
fees using the formula ($10,000 × load) + ($10,000 × (1 – load) × expense ratio) yields almost identical results for 
all of the paper’s analyses. We use the formula $10,000 × (expense ratio/12 + load) to calculate fees on a one-month 
investment.   12
The annualized returns since inception net of all fees reported in the prospectuses vary 
from a low of 1.3% for the Allegiant fund to a high of 5.9% for the Mason Street fund. All four 
student funds were established during a 19-month window, but the S&P 500 Index level ranged 
from 757 at the Mason Street fund’s inception to 1047 at the Allegiant fund’s inception. This 
variation in the S&P 500 Index value at inception is largely responsible for the differences in the 
reported return since inception. Note that the fund with the highest annualized return since 
inception (the Mason Street fund) is one of the two high-cost funds, whereas the fund with the 
lowest reported return since inception (the Allegiant fund) is the lowest-cost fund. The last two 
rows of Table 1 show that even excluding the impact of the sales load, the low-cost Allegiant 
fund has the highest historical alpha during the period in which all four funds were operational, 
and the funds’ tracking errors are nearly identical. 
We wanted to offer the same funds to the staff subjects, who were recruited two years 
after the student subjects. However, the Mason Street fund was acquired by American Century 
Investments in 2006 and incorporated into an existing American Century index fund. Therefore, 
we replaced the Mason Street fund with the Phoenix Insight Index Fund, which also has high 
fees and historical returns. The last four columns of Table 1 shows the characteristics of the 
funds offered to staff subjects. 
The three funds offered to both students and staff—the Allegiant, Morgan Stanley, and 
UBS funds—had similar expense ratios and front-end loads in 2005 and 2007. The total fees paid 
by staff subjects were generally lower, however, because their investment horizon was only one 
month, so they were charged for only one month of ongoing expenses rather than a full year. The 
liquidation of staff subjects’ portfolio after one month also triggered a 1% early-redemption fee 
for the UBS fund, raising its cost to staff subjects relative to its cost to student subjects. Whereas   13
the Morgan Stanley fund was the most expensive fund offered to student subjects, the Phoenix 
fund was the most expensive fund offered to staff subjects. 
Because the Phoenix fund had been in operation for more than ten years at the time of the 
staff experiment, its prospectus did not list an annualized return since inception, but instead listed 
a ten-year historical return. We reported this ten-year return for the Phoenix fund on the staff 
subjects’ returns sheet. The Phoenix fund’s 7.3% ten-year return is significantly higher than the 
other staff funds’ returns since inception, which are between 3.1% and 3.8%. In addition, the 
9.8% one-year historical return (including the sales load) listed in the Phoenix fund’s prospectus 
is much higher than the other staff funds’ one-year returns of less than 2%. This is because the 
most recent prospectus for the Phoenix fund listed returns through 2006 (a good year for the 
market), whereas the other prospectuses only listed returns through 2005.
5 In the last two rows of 
Table 1, we find that despite its high current expense ratio, the Phoenix fund has the highest 
historical alpha. It also has the highest tracking error. These findings are due to the fact that the 
Phoenix fund’s expense ratio used to be much lower and changed multiple times during its 
history.
6 During September 2007 (the investment period that determined staff payouts), the 
Phoenix fund had the lowest return (3.66%) and the Allegiant fund had the highest return 
(3.74%), as predicted by the current expense ratios. 
Recall that every staff subject was effectively given a call option whose strike price was 
$10,000 and whose underlying asset’s initial value was $10,000 × (1 – portfolio load).  This 
created large incentives for the staff subjects to make optimal choices. Based on the yield of the 
                                                 
5 The 2006 S&P 500 return was 15.78%, in contrast to the Phoenix fund’s 16.47% return before loads. The end of 
the prospectus reveals in a long table that excluding a non-recurring payment by the fund’s former administrator, the 
fund’s 2006 return was only 15.18%. The Phoenix fund’s annual report discloses that the payment was made 
because the administrator had previously been charging Phoenix more than had been contractually agreed upon. 
Even if one were to believe that similar payments were to be regular occurrences for Phoenix investors going 
forward, the expected payment over a one-month investment horizon is surely swamped by the fund’s 5.75% load. 
6 For example, the annualized expense ratio was 0.45% after fee waivers in the second half of 2005.   14
30-day Treasury bill and the implied S&P 500 volatility given by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) at the close of August 21, 2007—the day before the first staff 
sessions began—the Black-Scholes value of allocating 100% to the Allegiant fund was $170, 
whereas the value of allocating 100% to the Phoenix fund was $76. Therefore, each staff subject 
stood to gain $94 by moving from the worst portfolio to the best portfolio.  
 
2. Subject Characteristics 
  Our subjects are 391 Harvard staff members, 252 Wharton MBA and Ph.D. students, and 
87 students recruited primarily on the Harvard campus. Although we aimed to recruit only MBA 
subjects on the Wharton campus, we did not explicitly prohibit non-MBA students from 
participating in the experiment, so our Wharton campus subject pool included 15 college 
students and two Ph.D. students.
7 We group the MBA students with the Ph.D. students and refer 
to them collectively as the “MBA sample.” We group the college students on the Wharton 
campus with the student subjects at the Harvard campus and refer to them collectively as the 
“college sample.”  
  Table 2 gives summary statistics on our subject pools. The average staff subject is about 
40 years old, which means that they typically have a couple of decades of experience managing 
their personal finances. As expected, the student subjects are substantially younger. The majority 
of our staff subjects are female, whereas both the college and MBA samples have male 
majorities. The staff subjects are very well-educated: 88% have a college degree (almost all of 
these are bachelor’s degrees, not associate’s degrees), and 60% have some graduate education or 
a graduate degree. The “college” sample includes a few high school students who were taking 
                                                 
7 We confirmed the Harvard staff and Wharton student affiliations by checking their school-issued identification 
cards.   15
summer school classes on campus, as well as a few college graduates. Both MBAs and college 
subjects report extraordinarily high average SAT scores (the 98th and 99th percentiles, 
respectively).
8 
Every subject group is more financially literate than the typical American investor 
sampled in the John Hancock Defined Contribution Plan Survey (John Hancock Financial 
Services, 2002). Only 8% of John Hancock respondents correctly answered a multiple choice 
question about what kinds of assets a money market fund holds. We asked a similar question of 
our subjects and found that 21% of staff, 40% of MBAs, and 15% of college students answered 
correctly. John Hancock respondents on average thought that the stock of their own company 
was less risky than an equity mutual fund; on a 5-point scale, the average risk rating was 3.1 for 
employer stock and 3.6 for an equity mutual fund. In contrast, all ten of our experimental groups 
on average correctly rated a typical Fortune 500 stock as more risky than an equity mutual fund. 
However, this second comparison is potentially confounded by the fact that John Hancock 
respondents were asked about the stock of their own employer, whereas our subjects were asked 
about the stock of a typical Fortune 500 company. 
Through the luck of the draw, staff subjects in the fees treatment condition are younger, 
more likely to be female, and more educated than the other staff subjects. We will show in 
Section 4 that our treatment estimates are robust to controlling for these demographic 
differences. In addition, prospectus-only MBAs are less financially knowledgeable than other 
MBAs when judged by their knowledge of what a money market fund’s investments are. In 
unreported regressions, we find that controlling for whether this question was answered correctly 
                                                 
8 Approximately one-third of the MBAs and one-sixth of the college sample reported not having taken the SAT. 
Many of these subjects may be foreign students, which raises the concern that poor English skills or unfamiliarity 
with U.S. financial institutions may cause them to pay high fees. However, we find no significant difference in mean 
fees between student subjects who did and did not take the SAT (two-sided p-value of 0.54, not reported in a table).   16
does not qualitatively change our inference about the MBA fees treatment effect and strengthens 
the statistical significance of the returns treatment effect. 
Consistent with their high-powered incentives, staff subjects reported spending the most 
time reading the prospectuses: about 14 minutes on average. MBAs reported spending about 12 
minutes reading the prospectuses, and college students reported spending about 9 minutes.
9 
Students in both prospectus-only groups spent more time reading the prospectuses than the 
treatment groups, which seems sensible given that they received only the prospectuses and no 
additional materials. This pattern is reversed among staff subjects, who spent the least time 
reading the prospectuses when in the prospectus-only group, but the differences between the staff 
prospectus-only group and the other staff treatment groups are not statistically significant. 
As a whole, these numbers alleviate concerns that subjects simply randomized without 
exerting any mental effort when making their allocations. The average time spent reading the 
prospectuses should be enough for a knowledgeable subject to find the expenses in the four 
documents. Since participants could leave the experiment at any time they wished, time spent in 
the experiment likely reflects time actually spent in the decision-making process. Additional 
evidence against the randomization hypothesis comes from Wald tests, which reject equality of 
subjects’ mean allocations to each fund at the 1% level for all ten experimental groups. 
 
3. Main Experimental Results 
  Table 3 shows the mean portfolio fee (load plus expense ratio plus short-term redemption 
fee if applicable) paid in each condition by subject type, as well as the average (weighted by 
                                                 
9 When a subject reported a range of time, such as “10 to 15 minutes,” we assigned the midpoint of that range to the 
subject. The staff and MBA figures are close to those calculated from our own records of how much time elapsed 
between a subject’s receiving the experimental materials and his or her returning them to receive the debriefing   17
dollar allocation) annualized long-horizon historical return of the funds in the portfolios. Despite 
receiving no non-portfolio services whatsoever, the average fee paid by staff in the prospectus-
only condition is $456, which is higher than the $431 they would have paid if they had selected 
randomly, and much higher than the $255 they would have paid if they had allocated all $10,000 
to the lowest-cost fund, Allegiant. We cannot directly compare staff allocations to student 
allocations due to differing fund menus, but we can directly compare MBA and college student 
allocations. Contrary to our expectations, MBAs did no better than college students when simply 
provided with the mutual fund prospectuses. MBAs in the prospectus-only condition paid $421 
in fees on average, which is only $10 less than the average college prospectus-only fee, and we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the means are equal (two-sided p = 0.52). The fees of the 
average prospectus-only student’s portfolio are only slightly below the $443 fee they would have 
paid if they had chosen randomly and well above the $309 fee of the lowest-cost fund, Allegiant. 
The black bars in Figure 1 show the average prospectus-only group allocations across the 
four funds. Staff and MBA prospectus-only groups allocated only 18% to 19% of their money to 
both the lowest-cost fund, Allegiant, and the Morgan Stanley fund. But staff allocated 15 
percentage points less to the cheap UBS fund than MBAs because they invested 38% of their 
portfolio in the most expensive fund, Phoenix Insight (which was not offered to students). In 
contrast, MBAs invested only 23% in their costly fourth option, Mason Street (which was not 
offered to staff). 
Comparing MBA allocations to college student allocations is more straightforward 
because the two groups were offered the same set of funds. Both student prospectus-only groups’ 
allocations to the two cheap funds, Allegiant and UBS, are similar—19% and about 40%, 
                                                                                                                                                             
survey. Unfortunately, we did not keep our own records of how much time college subjects took, so we cannot 
independently corroborate their reports.   18
respectively. The groups’ allocations differ primarily in the way they decided to allocate the 
portion of their portfolio devoted to expensive funds: MBAs allocated more to Mason Street than 
Morgan Stanley (23% versus 18%), whereas the relative proportions are flipped (17% versus 
27%) for the college students. The slightly lower average fees paid by MBAs are not, however, 
primarily driven by their preference for Mason Street over Morgan Stanley. The more important 
factor is that MBAs allocated 59% to the two cheap funds in total, whereas college students 
allocated a slightly lower 56%. This total is an important determinant of portfolio fees because 
the two cheap funds’ fees are only 11 basis points apart, and the two expensive funds’ fees are 
only 34 basis points apart, but over 200 basis points separate the cheap funds from the expensive 
funds. 
 T h e   s e c o n d   r o w   o f   T a b l e   3   s hows that providing the fees sheet lowered the average fee 
paid by $24 for staff, $55 for MBAs, and $21 for college students. The drop is significant at the 
5% level for the staff and the 1% level for the MBAs, but it is insignificant for the college 
sample, both because of the smaller magnitude of the effect and the fact that the college sample 
is only a third of the size of the staff or MBA sample.
10 It seems that the MBAs’ sophistication 
manifested itself in their greater responsiveness to useful information.  
Nonetheless, most MBAs did not use the information optimally. The gray bars in Figure 
1 show a shift to the lowest-cost fund for the fees treatment groups relative to the prospectus-
only groups. But the staff, MBA, and college subjects in the fees treatment groups still allocated 
49%, 20%, and 37% of their assets to the two high-cost funds, respectively. The histograms in 
Figure 2 show that only 9% of staff subjects, 19% of MBA subjects, and 10% of college subjects 
in the fees treatment allocated all of their money to the lowest-cost fund. While these proportions   19
are higher than the 3% of staff, 6% of MBAs, and 0% of college students in the prospectus-only 
groups who allocated all their money to the cheapest fund, they are far from the 100% one would 
expect under optimal choice. This result suggests that search costs for fees alone cannot explain 
the tendency to invest in high-fee index funds, since the fees sheet brings these search costs close 
to zero.
11 Instead, subjects seem to value normatively irrelevant characteristics. 
  Given the existing evidence on mutual fund returns-chasing, a likely candidate for a non-
fee characteristic that subjects desire in their index funds is high past returns. The third row of 
Table 3 shows portfolio statistics for subjects who received the returns summary sheet that 
highlighted normatively irrelevant long-horizon past returns. The returns sheet increased returns-
chasing among students. MBAs’ average long-horizon historical return rose from 3.06% in the 
prospectus-only group to 3.53% under the returns treatment, a difference that is significant at the 
1% level. The college sample responded even more strongly to the irrelevant information in the 
returns sheet; the average return increased from 2.86% to 4.03%, a change that is also significant 
at the 1% level. The white bars in Figure 1 show that the Mason Street fund, which has the 
highest long-horizon historical return offered to students, gained portfolio share at the expense of 
every other fund. Because we had constructed the fund menu so that fees would be positively 
correlated with returns since inception, chasing past returns reduced expected future returns. The 
MBA returns treatment group paid $19 more on average than the MBA prospectus-only group, 
while the college returns treatment group paid $55 more than the college prospectus-only group.  
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Holding fixed the point estimate of the fee treatment effect size and the variance of subject fees, tripling the 
college sample size to match the MBA or staff sample size would result in the college fee treatment effect becoming 
significant at the 10% level.  
11 The fee summary sheet did not contain information on the UBS fund’s early-redemption fee, which affected only 
staff portfolios, although it did warn subjects, “Other fees may apply. Please check the fund’s prospectus for more 
details.” Even without the early-redemption fee, however, the UBS fund was more expensive than the Allegiant 
fund, so a cost-minimizing investor’s decision would not be affected by ignorance of the early-redemption fee.   20
  On the other hand, the returns sheet had no effect on staff. Staff in the returns treatment 
chose portfolios with an insignificantly lower average historical return than staff in the 
prospectus-only condition. We will discuss in Section 4 a potential explanation for why the 
returns sheet affected students but not staff. 
  The possibility that subjects are confused about the nature of S&P 500 index funds 
motivated our final treatment condition, in which subjects were given a page with answers to 
frequently asked questions about S&P 500 index funds. The fourth row of Table 3 shows 
portfolio statistics for staff subjects in this treatment group. Fees for this group are lower by $15 
relative to staff prospectus-only subjects, although the result is statistically significant at the 10% 
level only under a one-sided test. Despite the weak statistical significance, the hashed bars in the 
top panel of Figure 1 suggest that this drop is not just due to random variation. Both cheaper 
funds received more money in the FAQ treatment than in the prospectus-only condition, and 
both expensive funds received less money. The hashed bars in the top panel of Figure 2 show, 
however, that the FAQ treatment was not successful in increasing the number of subjects who 
chose the cheapest possible portfolio. 
 
4. Interpretation 
 I n   o r d e r   t o   g a i n   i n s i g h t   i n t o   w h a t   m o t i v a t e d  subjects’ decisions in the four experimental 
conditions, we asked them in the debriefing survey to rate how important eleven factors were in 
shaping their portfolio decision. We assign the integers 1 through 5 to the five possible ratings, 
with 1 corresponding to “not very important at all” and 5 corresponding to “very important.” 
Table 4 reports the average rating of each factor’s importance with the associated ordinal ranking 
in parentheses (lower numbers indicate greater ordinal importance).   21
The staff and college prospectus-only groups ranked fund performance over the past year 
and fund performance since inception as the first- and second-most important factors 
respectively. Fund fees, expenses, and loads were ranked fifth by prospectus-only staff and 
eighth by prospectus-only college students. In light of this ranking, it seems unlikely that these 
subjects’ search efforts were primarily directed towards finding the most relevant information 
about the funds—their cost. 
In contrast, MBA prospectus-only subjects ranked fees as the most important factor in 
their portfolio decision. As previously noted, however, their fees are not significantly lower on 
average than the college prospectus-only subjects’ fees. The minimal gain that the MBAs reaped 
from their prioritization of fees suggests that the cost of accurately finding fees in the 
prospectuses is relatively high even for MBAs and/or that the false allure of fund returns over the 
past year and since inception—ranked second and third by prospectus-only MBAs—and other 
factors is strong enough to offset the benefits of prioritizing fees. 
None of the prospectus-only groups ranked brand recognition or past experience with the 
fund companies as higher than their sixth-most important factor in their decision. In addition, 
customer service quality was ranked no higher than ninth, suggesting that subjects were not 
mistakenly applying decision rules that are perhaps relevant in the real world but not in the 
experimental task.
12 
Providing the fees sheet elevated the ranking of fees relative to their ranking in the 
prospectus-only condition. Staff subjects raised fees’ ordinal importance from fifth to second, 
                                                 
12 Most of the prospectuses had no meaningful mentions of non-portfolio services. The exception was the Phoenix 
fund’s prospectus, which discussed the availability of check-writing against one’s account; the ability to exchange 
shares by calling into the customer service number; and services that would automatically deduct money from one’s 
bank account and invest it in fund shares at a regular interval, automatically exchange a predetermined amount from 
one Phoenix fund to another at a regular interval, and automatically redeem a predetermined amount from the fund 
and deposit the proceeds in one’s bank account at a regular interval.   22
and college subjects from eighth to first. MBAs in both conditions ranked fees as their most 
important factor, but the cardinal rating of fees in the fees treatment is higher. Staff subjects 
receiving the FAQ sheet also increased their relative rating of fees’ importance slightly, raising 
their ordinal rank to fourth (versus fifth in the prospectus-only condition), although the cardinal 
rating of fees is lower than in the prospectus-only condition. 
The returns sheet similarly elevated the relative ranking of long-horizon past returns for 
students. College students in the returns treatment condition ranked returns since inception as 
their most important factor (versus second for the prospectus-only group), downgrading the more 
sensible one-year return factor to second place. MBAs in the returns treatment ranked the two 
past performance factors first and second (versus second and third for the prospectus-only 
group). On the other hand, consistent with the weak effects we saw in Table 3, staff’s ranking of 
returns’ importance does not seem to have responded to the returns sheet. 
 T h e s e   f a c t o r   r a n k i n g s   a p p e a r   to contain real information. Table 5 presents regressions—
run separately for staff, MBAs, and college students—where the dependent variable is portfolio 
fees or long-horizon past returns. The explanatory variables are treatment group dummies and 
the cardinal coding of how highly the subject ranked the eleven factors. Even after controlling 
for the information treatments, we find that within each subject group, those who rated fees as 
more important paid significantly less in fees. Increasing the numerical rating of fee importance 
by one is associated with a decrease in fees of between 15 and 19 basis points. 
We also find that those who rated past returns as more important chose portfolios with 
higher long-horizon historical returns. The magnitude of the returns since inception effect is 
similar for MBAs and college students: a one unit increase in the reported importance of fund 
performance since inception is associated with a 15 basis point increase in the portfolio’s   23
annualized returns since inception, and this effect is significant at the 5% level for MBAs and the 
10% level (p = 0.07) for college students. The returns since inception effect is positive but half 
the size for staff members, and misses significance at the 10% level (p = 0.12). Instead, for staff, 
importance placed on fund performance over the past year is a strongly significant correlate, with 
each unit rating increase associated with a 29 basis point increase in long-horizon past returns. 
Examining the other factor rankings, there is nothing that is consistently correlated with 
portfolio fees paid. In particular, importance placed on the fund’s customer service has a 
significant positive correlation with MBAs’ portfolio fees—perhaps suggesting a misapplication 
of a real-life heuristic in the experimental setting—but the coefficient is small, positive, and 
insignificant for staff, and negative and insignificant for college subjects. 
The fees and returns treatment effects are consistent with the summary sheets’ lowering 
search costs for subjects who value low fees and high past returns but observe both with 
considerable noise when given only prospectuses. When a valued characteristic is observed with 
more precision due to the summary sheets, subjects place more weight on it. 
Under this interpretation, the returns sheet’s null effect on staff—despite staff subjects’ 
high weight on past returns—implies that prospectus-only staff observed past long-horizon 
returns relatively precisely. This may be because staff were highly motivated by their large 
incentives and thus expended more effort than students in finding the past returns information. 
Staff, however, either did not expend as much effort finding the fees in the prospectuses or had a 
hard time finding them, so they did not precisely observe fees. Hence, the fees sheet had scope to 
shift staff portfolios towards lower-cost funds. 
The fact that highly motivated investors are able to accurately identify past returns in the 
prospectus does not necessarily imply that mutual fund advertising highlighting past returns has   24
no effect on investment decisions. In the real world, investors must contend with thousands of 
mutual funds instead of just four, so even very highly motivated investors are likely to observe 
most funds’ past returns imprecisely prior to seeing an advertisement.  
The search cost effects of the summary sheets may have been augmented by implicit 
advice effects, where subjects inferred that the information on the summary sheet is normatively 
important simply because it had been given to them by the experimenters. But if one chooses to 
interpret the treatment effects as arising entirely through the implicit advice channel, it is not 
obvious why staff heeded the implicit advice of the fees sheet but not the returns sheet.  
Finally, the failure of the FAQ treatment to move subjects close to the minimum-fee 
portfolio may be due to the answers not being clearly understood, or our not explicitly stating 
that the optimal portfolio allocates 100% to the lowest-cost fund.
13 Alternatively, the fees may 
have been too difficult to accurately identify in the prospectuses, causing subjects to place little 
weight on them in their portfolio decision. Subjects may also have continued to believe that there 
is a significant amount of active management in an index fund, leading to predictable 
outperformance unrelated to lower fees. Fund companies may intentionally contribute to this 
confusion in order to soften price competition (Gabaix, Laibson, and Li, 2005; Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2006; Carlin, 2009). For example, the Allegiant fund’s 2006 prospectus states: 
“However, the Adviser believes that employing certain active management strategies for a 
percentage of the Fund’s assets, if successful, will result in net returns after expenses that may 
more closely approximate the returns of the S&P 500 Index.” 
 
                                                 
13 We did not include such an explicit statement because of the experimenter demand effect it would produce, which 
would make the FAQ treatment effect difficult to interpret.   25
5. Relationship Between Portfolio Choices and Subject Characteristics 
  In this section, we examine how subject characteristics affected their portfolio choices. 
We first consider the impact of basic demographics. Table 6 regresses portfolio fees and long-
horizon historical returns on age, gender, education dummies, and treatment dummies, run 
separately for staff, MBA, and college subjects. 
Among staff subjects, we find that women paid higher fees, but there is surprisingly no 
relationship between education and fees. If anything, subjects who had only a high school 
education or less (the omitted educational category) paid the lowest fees on average. This is 
because low-education subjects were more prone to distribute their portfolios evenly among the 
four investment options instead of chasing the Phoenix Insight fund’s high past returns. 
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all educational groups paid the same fees on 
average (p-value = 0.16). We do reject at the 10% level the hypothesis that all educational groups 
chose portfolios with the same average long-horizon past return (p-value = 0.07), a finding 
primarily driven by the high returns-chasing tendencies of those with some graduate education 
but no graduate degree. The significant negative coefficient on the fees treatment dummy in the 
fees regression indicates that the staff fees treatment effect does not arise simply because staff 
who were randomized into the prospectus-only group were somewhat less educated than staff 
who were randomized into the fees treatment group. 
Among student subjects, we find that MBAs who are older and female chase past returns 
since inception more aggressively. We find no significant demographic correlates among the 
college students. Although there is little meaningful variation in educational attainment within 
each student group, we are able to examine the correlation between portfolio choices and SAT 
scores. In unreported regressions, we include total SAT scores (math plus verbal) as a control   26
variable for student subjects, which causes our sample size to drop in half due to missing score 
data. We find no significant relationship between SAT scores and fees; the point estimate 
indicates that a 100 point rise in combined SAT score is associated with only a 3 basis point 
decline in fees among MBAs and a 3 basis point rise in fees among college students.
14 
 I n   a d d i t i o n   t o   q u e s t i o n s   a b o u t  basic demographic characteristics, the debriefing survey 
included questions designed to gauge financial knowledge and investment confidence. The 
second, fifth, and eighth columns of Table 7 show the distribution of responses to questions 
about the likelihood of changing one’s decision in response to professional advice, confidence 
that one’s decision was optimal, self-assessed investment knowledge, and the types of 
investments found in a money market fund. MBAs score the highest on investment confidence 
and both the objective and self-assessed measures of financial knowledge. Staff subjects have 
intermediate levels of confidence and knowledge, and college students score the lowest on these 
measures. 
  The third, sixth, and ninth columns of Table 7 display striking negative relationships 
between fees and confidence, and between fees and knowledge. For example, in all three subject 
groups, the average fee increases monotonically with the self-reported likelihood that subjects 
would change their decision after consulting a professional investment advisor. The subjects who 
paid the highest fees themselves doubted that they were making the best portfolio allocation. 
Fees also generally fall with self-assessed confidence that the portfolio decision was the right one 
for the subject, self-assessed investment knowledge, and knowledge of the types of investments 
found in a money market fund. The most notable non-monotonicities occur among MBAs who 
                                                 
14 In contrast, Korniotis and Kumar (2009) argue that among discount brokerage investors who hold undiversified 
portfolios, trade frequently, or have a strong preference for local stocks, portfolios held by those with high cognitive 
ability outperform portfolios held by those with low cognitive ability. However, they find that high cognitive ability 
investors have no advantage when they hold diversified, passive portfolios.   27
consider themselves “very knowledgeable” investors and college subjects who are “very 
confident” about their portfolio decision; these extremely confident subjects paid higher fees 
than many of their less confident peers, but represent a small fraction of their respective samples 
(6% of MBA and 5% of college subjects). Staff who were “not at all confident” about their 
decision paid lower fees than “somewhat confident” and “less than confident” staff (due to the 
tendency of the least confident staff to distribute their allocations more evenly across funds than 
their slightly more confident peers), but this group too represents only a small fraction (7%) of 
the staff sample. 
In unreported regressions, we find that the negative relationship between financial 
knowledge/confidence and fees is generally present even after controlling for gender, education, 
and information treatment.
15 Therefore, responses to these survey questions are useful for 




The wide variation of fees in the S&P 500 index fund universe has been rationalized as 
reflecting heterogeneity in the value of non-portfolio services bundled with each index fund. We 
test this hypothesis by offering experimental subjects access to four S&P 500 index funds’ 
returns stripped of these non-portfolio services. The optimal portfolio allocates everything to the 
lowest-cost fund. 
                                                 
15 The self-reported confidence and knowledge variables are assigned an integer from 1 to 3 or 1 to 5 in the 
regressions. For Harvard staff, self-assessed investment knowledge, confidence, and likelihood to change one’s 
decision are significant. For MBAs, knowledge of money market fund investments and likelihood to change one’s 
decision are significant. For college students, self-assessed investment knowledge and confidence are significant, 
and likelihood to change one’s decision has a p-value of 0.13.   28
Despite this unbundling, subjects overwhelmingly failed to minimize index fund fees. 
Instead, they placed heavy weight on irrelevant attributes such as funds’ annualized returns since 
inception. Highlighting these misleading historical returns caused student subjects (in one of our 
randomized experimental treatments) to chase those returns even more intensely, despite the 
negative future return consequences such behavior had. Even subjects who claimed to prioritize 
fees in their portfolio decision showed minimal sensitivity to the fee information in the 
prospectus. Subjects apparently do not understand that S&P 500 index funds are commodities. In 
our experiment, fees paid are increasing in financial illiteracy. In the real world, this problem is 
likely to be exacerbated by the financial advisors whose compensation is increasing in the fees of 
the mutual funds they sell to their clients. When consumers in a commodity market observe 
prices and quality with noise, a high degree of competition will not drive markups to zero 
(Gabaix, Laibson, and Li, 2005; Carlin, 2009). Our results suggest that such noise helps account 
for the large amount of price dispersion in the mutual fund market. 
  Natural policy responses to suboptimal choices are to improve disclosure and educate 
investors. We test two such interventions and find that portfolio allocation improves modestly 
but remains far away from the optimum. Beshears et al. (2009) test another disclosure 
intervention that provides experimental subjects a simplified summary of the prospectus and find 
that such an intervention yields little change in allocations among actively managed funds 
relative to when subjects simply receive the statutory prospectus. In sum, although better 
disclosure and financial education may be helpful, the evidence in this paper and Beshears et al. 
(2008) indicate that their effect on portfolios is likely to be modest. 
Our results also suggest that developing reliable ways of eliciting agents’ confidence in 
their own actions may prove to be a fruitful way of identifying areas in which optimization errors   29
are economically important. We show that subjects who pay higher fees tend to be less sure that 
they are maximizing their own utility. Students taking a math exam can roughly predict whether 
they correctly answered a question. Economic agents may also know when they are likely to 
have made an error in a real-life maximization problem. Regrettably, having a sense that your 
choice is wrong does not necessarily tell you how to fix it.   30
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 Table 1. Characteristics of S&P 500 index funds used in experiment 
This table shows information on the S&P 500 index funds offered to student and staff subjects. With the exception of the last three rows, this 
table’s information is taken from the most up-to-date prospectuses available at the time of the applicable experimental sessions. All information is 
for the funds’ Class A shares. The approximate fee on a $10,000 investment is calculated for the applicable investment horizon: one year for the 
students, and one month for the staff. The last three rows do not reflect loads or taxes and are calculated starting in the first full calendar month in 
which all the experimental session’s funds were operating and ending in the last full calendar month before the experimental session took place 
(November 1998 to July 2005 for student subjects, and November 1998 to July 2007—excluding April 2006, when the Phoenix fund received a 
one-time payment—for staff subjects). The alpha and R
2 are from a regression of the fund’s monthly return in excess of the risk-free rate on the 
S&P 500 return (including dividends) in excess of the risk-free rate.  
  MBA and college students (2005)  Harvard staff (2007) 








Insight  UBS 
Ticker symbol  AEXAX  MISAX  SPIAX  PSPIX  AEXAX  SPIAX  HIDAX  PSPIX 
Inception date  10/15/1998  3/31/1997   9/26/1997   10/2/1998   10/15/1998   9/26/1997   4/19/1996   10/2/1998  
Minimum opening 
balance 
$500   $1,000   $1,000   $1,000   $500   $1,000   $500   $1,000  
Expense ratio
a  0.59%  0.80%  0.64%  0.70%  0.60%  0.64%  0.73%  0.70% 
Front-end load  2.50%  4.75%  5.25%  2.50%  2.50%  5.25%  5.75%  2.50% 
Approximate fee on 
$10,000 investment 
$309   $555   $589   $320   $255   $530   $581   $356
b 
1-year return reported 
in prospectus
c 
23.23%  21.57%  21.11%  24.58%  1.62%  –1.16%  9.77%  1.69% 
5-year return reported 
in prospectus
c 
–1.88%  –2.19%  –2.34%  –1.74%  –0.56%  –1.18%  4.75%  –0.60% 
Longest-horizon return 
reported in prospectus 
1.28%
d 5 . 9 0 %
d 2 . 5 4 %
d 2 . 5 4 %
d 3 . 0 8 %
d 3 . 6 4 %
d 7 . 3 4 %




15.49%  15.49%  15.51%  15.51%  14.11%  14.11%  14.08%  14.12% 
Monthly alpha  –0.047%  –0.057%  –0.057%  –0.053%  –0.046%  –0.054%  –0.039%  –0.054% 
R
2  99.99%  99.98%  99.99%  99.99%  99.99%  99.99%  99.96%  99.99% 
a After fee waivers. 
b Includes 1% early redemption fee. 
c Annualized returns before taxes but after loads and fees. 
d Return since fund inception. 
e 10-year return. 
 Table 2. Experimental subject characteristics 
This table shows the characteristics of the subjects. Some fields are blank because certain questions were not asked of all subjects. SAT 
scores for subjects 27 or more years old are adjusted upward to reflect the April 1995 recentering of SAT scores. See 
http://www.collegeboard.com/sat/cbsenior/equiv/rt027027.html for the conversion table. Some statistics are calculated with slightly 
smaller sample sizes than reported in the last row, due to non-response. 
  Harvard staff  MBA students  College students 




















Average age  41.1  39.4  41.5  40.4  27.7  27.4  27.4  21.0  22.0  21.0 
Percent male  37%  29%  35%  37%  63%  66%  70%  50%  48%  63% 
Highest education                     
   High school or less  3%  0%  5%  1%  1%  0%  0%  7%  10%  8% 
   Some college  9%  11%  8%  9%  1%  0%  0%  83%  76%  74% 
   College degree  30%  22%  28%  34%  98%  100%  100%  10%  14%  19% 
   Some grad school  19%  15%  20%  19%  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Graduate degree  39%  52%  38%  37%  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
SAT I score                     
   Average verbal  --  --  --  --  714  717  719  759  760  741 
   Average math  --  --  --  --  730  741  737  752  752  730 
   Didn’t take SAT  --  --  --  --  30%  35%  33%  20%  17%  11% 
   Don’t remember or 
   don’t wish to answer 
--  --  --  --  23%  15%  14%  7%  10%  11% 
Knows what a money 
market fund holds 
28%  19%  22%  18%  33%  42%  44%  14%  17%  14% 
Average risk rating  
(1 to 5; higher = 
riskier) 
          
   Fortune 500 stock  3.34  3.49  3.59  3.58  3.02  3.36  3.28  3.57  3.14  2.79 
   U.S. equity mutual  
   fund 




13.3  13.4  14.3  14.4  13.6  11.1  10.7  11.2  8.4  8.5 
Sample size  N = 97  N = 97  N = 100  N = 97  N = 83  N = 85  N = 84  N = 30  N = 29  N = 28 Table 3. Average portfolio fees and historical returns 
The top half of the table gives the average (weighted by dollar allocation) fees and historical returns of the funds chosen by each 
experimental group. For staff, the historical return is the longest-horizon annualized return reported in the fund’s prospectus. For 
students, the historical return is the annualized return since fund inception. The bottom half of the table reports two-sided p-values of t 
tests for the equality of mean fees and historical returns, allowing for each group to have a different variance. The null hypothesis is 
listed in the first column, and each subsequent column corresponds to a different subject population and variable whose equality is 
being tested. For example, the second column in the row containing “Prospectus only = fees treatment” reports the p-value for the test 
that the prospectus-only Harvard staff subjects paid the same average fee as the Harvard staff subjects in the fees treatment group. 
 

















returns since  
inception 
Prospectus only group  $456  4.96%  $421  3.06%  $431  2.86% 
Fees treatment group  $432  4.80%  $366  2.30%  $410  2.61% 
Returns treatment group  $450  4.90%  $440  3.53%  $486  4.03% 
FAQ treatment group  $441  4.82%  --  --  --  -- 
            
Two-sided p-values from t tests of 
equality of means (unequal variances) 
  Prospectus only = fees treatment  0.045  0.346  0.000  0.000  0.290  0.152 
  Prospectus only = returns treatment  0.612  0.690  0.164  0.012  0.002  0.000 
  Prospectus only = FAQ treatment  0.186  0.402  --  --  --  -- 
  Fees treatment = returns treatment  0.109  0.538  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  Fees treatment = FAQ treatment  0.454  0.926  --  --  --  -- 
 Table 4. Importance of various factors in subjects’ investment decision 
Each cell reports the average importance the factor had on the relevant subsample’s investment decision, as elicited in the debriefing 
surveys. There are five possible responses, from “not important at all” to “very important.” We assign integers 1 through 5 to each 
possible response, with higher integers corresponding to greater importance. Each factor’s ordinal rank for the relevant subsample is in 
parentheses, with lower integers corresponding to greater ordinal importance. The last row lists the greatest number of observations used 
to calculate each column’s average ratings; some factors’ average ratings use slightly fewer observations due to non-response. 
 






















Quality of prospectus  2.61 (7)  2.80 (6)  2.65 (7)  2.65 (7)  2.27 (9)  2.46 (9)  2.65 (8)  2.75 (5)  2.93 (4)  2.96 (5) 
Brand recognition  2.36 (8)  2.32 (8)  2.36 (8)  2.29 (8)  2.75 (6)  2.77 (6)  2.75 (7)  2.63 (7)  2.79 (5)  3.00 (4) 
Past experience with 
fund companies 
2.20 (9)  2.15 (9)  2.25 (9)  1.96 (9)  2.39 (8)  2.74 (7)  2.57 (9)  1.43 (11)  2.11 (9)  2.26 (8) 
Fund fees, expenses, 
and loads 
3.05 (5)  3.41 (2)  2.92 (5)  2.94 (4)  3.72 (1)  4.19 (1)  3.53 (3)  2.59 (8)  3.39 (1)  2.54 (7) 
Minimum opening 
balance requirements 
1.96 (11)  2.10 (10)  1.86 (11)  1.89 (10)  1.77 (11)  2.07 (11)  1.80 (11)  1.60 (10)  1.97 (10)  1.68 (11) 
Investment objectives  3.18 (3)  3.39 (4)  3.08 (4)  3.23 (3)  3.24 (4)  3.52 (4)  3.41 (4)  3.00 (4)  2.76 (6)  2.79 (6) 
Fund performance 
over the past year 
3.57 (1)  3.88 (1)  3.58 (1)  3.52 (1)  3.54 (2)  3.73 (2)  3.78 (1)  4.17 (1)  3.17 (2)  3.54 (2) 
Fund performance 
since inception 
3.40 (2)  3.40 (3)  3.45 (2)  3.30 (2)  3.45 (3)  3.63 (3)  3.72 (2)  3.87 (2)  2.97 (3)  3.86 (1) 
Fund performance 
over different horizon 
2.89 (6)  2.63 (7)  2.73 (6)  2.68 (6)  2.67 (7)  3.16 (5)  2.88 (5)  2.72 (6)  2.18 (8)  2.22 (9) 
Customer service of 
fund 
2.02 (10)  2.06 (11)  1.94 (10)  1.85 (11)  1.87 (10)  2.17 (10)  1.90 (10)  1.97 (9)  1.93 (11)  1.82 (10) 
Desire to diversify 
across funds 
3.07 (4)  2.81 (5)  3.18 (3)  2.75 (5)  2.89 (5)  2.73 (8)  2.78 (6)  3.33 (3)  2.76 (6)  3.39 (3) 
Sample size  N = 97 N  = 97  N = 100  N = 96 N  = 83
  N = 84  N = 83  N = 30
  N = 29  N = 28 Table 5. Effect of factor importance ranking on portfolio fees and historical returns 
This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is portfolio fee or average fund historical 
returns (dollar-weighted). For staff, the historical return is the longest-horizon annualized return reported 
in the fund’s prospectus. For students, the historical return is the annualized return since fund inception. 
The first eleven rows report coefficients on the importance each respective factor had on the subject’s 
investment decision, as elicited in the debriefing surveys. There were five possible responses to these 
questions, from “not important at all” to “very important.” We assigned integers 1 through 5 to each 
possible response, with higher integers corresponding to greater importance. Fees treatment, Returns 
treatment, and FAQ treatment are dummies for being in the fees treatment, returns treatment, and FAQ 
treatment condition, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 



















-19.15**  -0.208**  -18.11** -0.239** -15.11*  -0.086  Fund fees, expenses, 
and loads  (2.94)  (0.042)  (4.35)   (0.061)  (6.56)  (0.080) 
11.20**  0.288**  -6.74  -0.046  -12.80  -0.065  Fund performance 
over the past year  (3.85)  (0.054)  (4.82)  (0.068)   (9.36)  (0.114) 
9.79*  0.084  5.90  0.145*  2.30  0.147  Fund performance 
since inception  (3.83)  (0.054)  (4.76)   (0.067)  (6.68)  (0.081) 
4.61  0.033  -5.21  -0.043  6.45  0.092  Fund performance 
over different horizon  (3.32)  (0.047)   (4.48)  (0.063)  (7.35)  (0.090) 
0.53  0.002  14.08*  0.139  -7.32  -0.210  Customer service of 
fund  (4.56)  (0.065)   (5.76)   (0.081)  (8.80)  (0.107) 
-5.30  -0.240**  -0.48  -0.158*  2.39  -0.015  Brand recognition 
(3.93)  (0.056)  (  4.92)  (0.069)  (6.29)  (0.077) 
-2.36  -0.017  3.49  0.097  11.50  0.198*  Past experience with 
fund companies  (3.49)  (0.049)  (4.26)  (0.060)  (6.38)  (0.078) 
6.72  0.033  0.32  0.018  -4.31  -0.130  Quality of prospectus 
(3.84)  (0.054)  ( 5.04)  (0.071)  (7.14)  (0.087) 
1.31  -0.013  -2.07  -0.050  6.73  0.110  Minimum opening 
balance requirements  (3.87)  (0.055)  (5.24)  (0.074)  (8.65)  (0.105) 
-0.22  0.027  -2.58  -0.002  -2.75  -0.094  Investment objectives 
(3.50)  (0.050)  (3.75)    (.053)  (5.92)  (0.072) 
-2.50  -0.048  8.88*  -0.002  9.41  -0.035  Desire to diversify 
across funds  (3.09)  (0.044)    (4.05)  (0.057)  (6.90)  (0.084) 
-21.58*  -0.194  -44.27** -0.697** -20.74  -0.368  Fees treatment 
(10.80)  (0.153)  (12.50)   (0.176)  (21.19)  (0.258)  
-0.27  0.006  16.00  0.401*  30.25  0.873** Returns treatment  
(10.65)  (0.151)  (12.13)   (0.170)  (20.34)  (0.248) 
-18.18  -0.228          FAQ treatment 
(10.68)  (0.151)         
431.19**  4.770**  394.14** 3.728** 405.39**  3.374** Constant 
 (19.66)  (0.278)  (28.21)  (0.396)  (37.47)  (0.457) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2139  0.2272  0.2078  0.2250  0.1847  0.4198 
Sample size  N = 365  N = 365  N = 239  N = 239  N = 78  N = 78 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. Table 6. Demographic correlates of portfolio fees and historical returns 
This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is portfolio fee or average fund 
historical returns (dollar-weighted). For staff, the historical return is the longest-horizon 
annualized return reported in the fund’s prospectus. For students, the historical return is the 
annualized return since fund inception. Female is a dummy for female gender. Some college, 
College degree, Some graduate school, and Graduate degree are dummies for the highest 
educational attainment reported by subjects; “high school or less” is the omitted category. Fees 
treatment, Returns treatment, and FAQ treatment are dummies for being in the fees treatment, 
returns treatment, and FAQ treatment condition, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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2  0.0261  0.0089  0.1312  0.2143  0.1677  0.3760 
Sample size  N = 389  N = 389  N = 250  N = 250  N = 87  N = 87 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. Table 7. Portfolio fees and historical returns by investor confidence and knowledge 
This table reports the frequency of responses to four debriefing survey questions and the average (weighted by dollar allocation) 
portfolio fee or fund historical returns of those who gave each response. 


























How likely is it that you would 
change your decision if you 
consulted a professional investment 
advisor? 
         
   Not at all likely  13%  $456  4.42%  20%  $389  2.76%  6%  $395  2.60% 
   Somewhat likely  50%  $513  4.94%  54%  $409  2.96%  41%  $435  3.00% 
   Very likely  37%  $519  4.95%  26%  $424  3.12%  53%  $453  3.33% 
                  
How confident are you that the 
decision you made is the right one 
for you? 
             
   Very confident  8%  $454  4.56%  12%  $356  2.64%  5%  $443  3.34% 
   Relatively confident  28%  $497  4.71%  47%  $384  2.98%  25%  $420  2.91% 
   Somewhat confident  39%  $521  5.01%  25%  $413  2.99%  31%  $441  3.07% 
   Less than confident  19%  $520  4.99%  13%  $414  2.89%  23%  $458  3.29% 
   Not at all confident  7%  $505  4.90%  4%  $439  3.63%  16%  $458  3.43% 
                  
How knowledgeable an investor do 
you consider yourself to be? 
             
   Very knowledgeable  2%  $422  4.37%  6%  $427  3.20%  1%  $320  2.50% 
   Relatively knowledgeable  12%  $476  4.66%  22%  $397  2.89%  10%  $412  2.90% 
   Somewhat knowledgeable  40%  $510  4.91%  35%  $408  2.87%  24%  $430  2.95% 
   Less than knowledgeable  31%  $518  4.90%  30%  $409  2.94%  28%  $432  3.09% 
   Not at all knowledgeable  15%  $519  5.00%  6%  $450  3.68%  37%  $470  3.42% 
                  
Which of the following types of 
investments are found in a money 
market fund? 
          
Correct answer (short-term U.S. 
government bonds) 
21%  $500  4.94%  40%  $393  2.80%  15%  $442  3.24% 
Incorrect answer (corporate 
bonds, stocks, none of the above) 
79%  $509  4.85%  60%  $420  3.06%  85%  $445  3.15% Figure 1. Average fund allocations by 






































































































































































Figure 2. Histogram of fees paid by subject type  
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Prospectus only Fees treatment Returns treatment
 Appendix A. Staff Investment Choice Sheet 
 
Subject number: ____________
Please allocate $10,000 among the S&P 500 index funds listed below. You may choose to allocate all 
$10,000 to one fund or allocate your investment evenly or unevenly across as many funds as you like.   
 
We will calculate how much money a real investor would get back if he or she sent $10,000 to the funds 
below according to the allocation that you choose, assuming that each fund received the investment at 
3:00 P.M. on August 31, 2007, and the investments were sold at 3:00 P.M. on Friday, September 28, 
2007 (the last business day of September). If the investment is worth more than $10,000 at the end of 
September 28, 2007, we will pay you the investment profit (the investment value minus $10,000). If the 
investment is worth less than $10,000 at the end of the period, you will not be responsible for these 
losses. This is a risk-free opportunity to win a potentially large reward.   
 
 
PAYOFF CALCULATION EXAMPLES 
Example #1:  Suppose selling your hypothetical investment on September 28, 2007 would give you 
$11,000. Then we would pay you $1,000, the difference between your original investment and your final 
investment value at the end of September (in addition to the $10 participation payment you will receive 
today). 
 
Example #2:  Suppose selling your hypothetical investment on September 28, 2007 would give you 
$8,500. Since your final account balance is less than $10,000, you would not be paid for your 
investment (but you would still keep the $10 participation payment you will receive today). 
 
 
Below is the menu of S&P 500 index funds from which you may choose.   
x  Write the dollar amount you would like to allocate to each fund in the last column 
x  You may invest in as many or as few funds as you choose 
x  Please be careful to allocate a total of exactly $10,000 




Mutual Fund  Symbol  Minimum Opening Allocation 
if Buying Shares in Fund 
Your Allocation in Dollars 
(column must sum to $10,000)
Allegiant S&P 500 Index 
Fund - Class A  AEXAX  $500    
Morgan Stanley S&P 500 
Index Fund - Class A  SPIAX  $1,000   
Phoenix Insight Index Fund 
- Class A  HIDAX  $500    
UBS S&P 500 Index Fund - 
Class A  PSPIX  $1,000    
Æ The prospectuses for these 4 funds are attached Å 
Any  portfolio  allocations  which  violate  minimum  opening  allocation  requirements  or 
which fail to total $10,000 will be ineligible for the investment payout. 





x Mutual funds charge fees to investors. 
 
x Some mutual funds charge a one-time fee when you purchase shares. This fee is called a front-
end load and is a fixed percent of your purchase amount. 
 
x Mutual funds also charge an ongoing fee that is a predetermined fraction of the fund balance. 
Over the course of one year, the total ongoing fee approximately equals:  
          (Your average fund balance) × (The fundﾒ’s expense ratio) 
 
x Other fees may apply.  Please check the fundﾒ’s prospectus for more details. 
 
 
TABLE OF FEES 
 
Mutual fund  Symbol   Front-end load
Front-end load fee if 
you purchase $10,000 
worth of shares 
Expense ratio 
Approximate annual 
ongoing fee if your 
average balance is 
$10,000 
Allegiant S&P 500 
Index Fund - Class A  AEXAX  2.50%  $250  0.60%  $60 
Morgan Stanley S&P 
500 Index Fund  
- Class A 
SPIAX  5.25%  $525  0.64%  $64 
Phoenix Insight Index 
Fund - Class A  HIDAX  5.75%  $575  0.73%  $73 
UBS S&P 500 Index 
Fund - Class A  PSPIX  2.50%  $250  0.70%  $70 
   
Expense ratio example 
 
If the average balance is $10,000 and the 
expense ratio is 0.60%, then an investor 
would pay approximately 
 
$10,000 × 0.60% = $60 
 
in ongoing fees over the course of one year. 
Front-end load example 
 
If you purchase $10,000 worth of shares in a 
fund and the front-end load is 2.5%, then you 
would pay 
 
$10,000 × 2.5% = $250 
 




Mutual Fund  Symbol 
Average Annual Return  
(During Longest Time Period  
Reported in Fundﾒ’s Prospectus)
1 
Allegiant S&P 500 Index Fund - Class A  AEXAX  3.1% 
2 
Morgan Stanley S&P 500 Index Fund - 
Class A  SPIAX  3.6% 
3 
Phoenix Insight Index Fund - Class A  HIDAX  7.3% 
4 
UBS S&P 500 Index Fund - Class A  PSPIX  3.8% 
5 
1 Includes the effect of fees, expenses, and sales loads, but not taxes. 
2 10/15/1998 ﾖ– 12/31/2005 
3 09/26/1997 ﾖ– 12/31/2005 
4 01/01/1997 ﾖ– 12/31/2006 
5 10/02/1998 ﾖ– 12/31/2005 
 
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.   Appendix D. Staff FAQ Sheet 
 
 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs) 
 
QUESTION 1: What is a mutual fund? 
 
Answer: A mutual fund invests money on your behalf.  
Any money you give a mutual fund to manage will earn the same 
percent return as the investments the mutual fund holds, minus the 
fees the mutual fund charges you for its services. 
 
QUESTION 2: What is an S&P 500 index fund? 
 
Answer: An S&P 500 index fund is a mutual fund that tries to 
make its pre-fee investment return approximate the S&P 500 
Indexﾒ’s investment return. 
 
QUESTION 3: What is the S&P 500 Index? 
 
Answer: The S&P 500 Index measures the total stock market value 
of 500 of the largest U.S. companies. It is one of the most widely 
used stock market indexes in the world. 
The investment return of the S&P 500 Index is the percent change 
over time in the total stock market value of these 500 companies. Appendix E. Staff Debriefing Questionnaire 
 
Please complete this short questionnaire and return it to be eligible for receiving payment. 
 
1.  Age:  ______________    
 
2.  Gender (please circle):  Male / Female  
 
3.  What is the highest level of education listed that you have completed? (Check only one.) 
  
 Some high school 
   High school graduate 
   First year of college 
   Second year of college 
   Third year of college 
   College graduate 
 
4.  In the previous task, you were asked to allocate $10,000 among four different mutual 
funds. How important were the following factors in shaping your final investment 
decision?  (Please check the appropriate boxes.) 












A.  Quality of prospectus           
B.  Brand recognition               
C.  Past experience with fund companies           
D.  Fund fees, expenses, and loads           
E.  Minimum opening balance 
requirements 
     
F.  Investment objectives           
G.  Fund performance over the past year           
H.  Fund performance since inception           
I.  Fund performance over a different 
horizon 
     
J.  Customer service of fund           
K.  Desire to diversify across funds           
L.  Other:  _________________________           5.   How likely is it that you would change your decision if you consulted a professional 
investment advisor? (Please check only one box.) 
 
  Very likely  
  Somewhat likely  
  Not likely 
 
 
6.  Did you look at the fundsﾒ’ prospectuses to help you make your decision?  
 
  Yes  If so, for how long?  Approximately ___________ minutes 
  No 
 
 
7.  How confident are you that the decision you made is the right one for you? (Please check 
only one box.) 
 
  Very confident  
  Relatively confident 
  Somewhat confident 
  Less than confident 
  Not at all confident 
 
 
8.  How knowledgeable an investor do you consider yourself to be? (Please check only one 
box.) 
 
  Very knowledgeable 
  Relatively knowledgeable 
  Somewhat knowledgeable 
  Less than knowledgeable 
  Not at all knowledgeable 
 
 
9.  Please rate each of the following investmentsﾒ’ riskiness on a scale of 1 to 5.  
  (1 indicates ﾓ“no riskﾔ” and 5 indicates ﾓ“very high risk.ﾔ” Circle the appropriate number.) 
 
            No risk         Very high risk 
(a) A large U.S. stock mutual fund    1     2     3     4     5   Donﾒ’t know 
(b) A savings account at your bank     1     2     3     4     5   Donﾒ’t know 
(c) U.S. corporate bonds  1     2     3     4     5    Donﾒ’t know 
(d) Stable value/money market fund  1     2     3     4     5    Donﾒ’t know 
(e) Stock of a typical Fortune 500 company   1     2     3     4     5    Donﾒ’t know 
(f) An international stock mutual fund  1     2     3     4     5   Donﾒ’t know 
(g) An emerging markets stock mutual fund  1     2     3     4     5   Donﾒ’t know  
10.  What return do you expect the following asset types to earn annually, on average, during 
the next five years? (Please give your best guess. If you expect an asset type to lose 
money on average, write a negative number.) 
  U.S. stocks        _____%     
  U.S. corporate bonds   _____% 
  Money market funds  _____%     
  Stable value funds      _____% 
 
11.  Which of the following types of investments are found in a money market fund? (You 
may check more than one type.) 
 
  Short-term U.S. government bonds 
  Corporate bonds 
  Stocks 
  None of the above 
 